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Differentially Private LQ Control
Kasra Yazdani∗, Austin Jones†, Kevin Leahy†, Matthew Hale∗
Abstract
As multi-agent systems proliferate and share more and more user data, new approaches are needed to protect
sensitive data while still guaranteeing successful operation. To address this need, we present a private multi-agent LQ
control framework. We consider problems in which each agent has linear dynamics and the agents are coupled by a
quadratic cost. Generating optimal control values for the agents is a centralized operation, and we therefore introduce
a cloud computer into the network for this purpose. The cloud is tasked with aggregating agents’ outputs, computing
control inputs, and transmitting these inputs to the agents, which apply them in their state updates. Agents’ state
information can be sensitive and we therefore protect it using differential privacy. Differential privacy is a statistical
notion of privacy enforced by adding noise to sensitive data before sharing it, and agents will therefore add noise to
all data before sending it to the cloud. The result is a private multi-agent LQG framework in which agents’ states
are protected from both the cloud and other agents. Adding noise to agents’ data certainly impacts the performance
of the system, and we provide a trade-off between agents’ privacy levels and the entropy seen at the cloud as a
measure of how difficult it is to compute control values when privacy is enforced. We further characterize this system
by bounding the accuracy with which an adversary could predict agents’ states by using the differentially private
information they share. Simulation results are provided to validate the theoretical developments made.
I. INTRODUCTION
M
ANY multi-agent systems, such as smart power grids, robotic swarms, and traffic monitoring systems,
require agents to exchange information to work together. In some cases, the information shared may be
rather sensitive. For example, power consumption data in a smart power grid can expose certain habits, behaviors,
and activities of an individual including his or her daily schedule [1]–[5]. Sensitive user data should therefore be
protected when it is shared, though of course it must remain useful in multi-agent coordination. Hence, providing
privacy in the setting of multi-agent control should protect sensitive data from the recipient of a transmission while
still ensuring that transmitted data remains useful to that recipient.
Recently, privacy of this form has been achieved using differential privacy. Differential privacy originates in the
database literature, and was originally designed to protect sensitive data of individuals when databases are queried
∗Kasra Yazdani and Matthew Hale are with the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Florida, Gainesville,
FL USA. Emails: {kasra.yazdani,matthewhale}@ufl.edu.
†Austin Jones and Kevin Leahy are with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA USA. Emails:
{austin.jones,kevin.leahy}@ll.mit.edu.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
This material is based upon work supported by the United States Air Force under Air Force Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0001. Any opinions,
findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
United States Air Force.
January 8, 2019 DRAFT
2[6]–[8]. The overall goal of differential privacy is to allow accurate statistical analyses of a population while
providing strong, provable privacy guarantees to individuals. Differential privacy is an attractive choice of privacy
framework because it is immune to post-processing [9], in the sense that further computations can be performed on
private data without affecting the privacy guarantees afforded to an individual. For example, filtering private data
can be done without threatening single users’ privacy [10], [11]. Another motivation for using differential privacy
is its robustness to side information [12], which means that its privacy guarantees are not defeated by an adversary
who has gained access to additional information about data-producing entities.
Recently, the notion of differential privacy has been extended to dynamical systems [10] in which trajectory-
valued data must be protected, and it is this notion of differential privacy that we use in the multi-agent control
setting. Differential privacy for dynamical systems is implemented at the trajectory level, which guarantees that an
output data stream does not expose the state trajectory of a system. The existing literature provides other methods
such as k-anonymity [13] and homomorphic encryption [14] to protect sensitive data. Neither of these techniques
readily accomplishes one of the objectives of this paper, which is to conceal sensitive information from the cloud
while enabling the cloud to compute optimal control values for agents, as we detail below. In general, k-anonymity
is not robust to side information and we expect homomorphic encryption to scale poorly with the size of a network,
mainly because of its significant computational burden.
In this paper, we use differential privacy to develop a private multi-agent LQ control framework. Adding noise
makes this problem equivalent to a multi-agent linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) problem, and the optimal controller
will be linear in the expected value of agents’ states. Computing this expected value is a centralized operation,
and we therefore augment the network with a cloud computer [15]. In contrast to some existing approaches, the
cloud is not a trusted third party and does not receive sensitive information from any agent [16]. The cloud instead
gathers private information from the agents, estimates their current states, and generates optimal control inputs.
These inputs are transmitted back to the agents which apply them in their local state updates, and then this process
of exchanging information and updating states repeats.
We consider a discrete-time LQG tracking control problem in which each agent’s state evolves according to linear
dynamics and where the cloud computes optimal control inputs that minimize the expected quadratic state-tracking
error and input energy over time. The LQG control problem formulation is well-studied and widely used in optimal
control [17]–[20], and has broad applications across network systems. For example, the authors in [21] investigate
an implementation of an LQG problem formulation to control power flows among microgrids. Our formulation uses
differential privacy to keep both each agent’s state trajectory and its reference trajectory’s limit private. Adding the
noise required to do so will of course affect the functioning of the system, and we bound these effects to give a
rigorous understanding of their influence. In particular, we quantify the effects of privacy by bounding the entropy
seen by the cloud as a means of bounding how difficult it is for the cloud to generate control values for the agents.
After that, we bound the error in an adversary’s predictions of the agents’ states. This bound is in terms of problem
data and agents’ privacy parameters, and it provides a quantitative demonstration of how differential privacy protects
the agents’ state trajectories by making an adversary’s predictions inaccurate.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [22]. The privacy framework proposed in this paper differs from
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3that in [22] because it does not rely on a trusted aggregator and keeps all data private from the cloud. Work in
[22] also gave an entropy upper bound and this paper adds a complementary lower bound, while also bounding
an adversary’s ability to predict agents’ states. This paper further allows for each agent to track a reference and
protects its reference trajectory with differential privacy, while [22] did not accommodate reference trajectories.
Finally, this paper provides additional simulation results for the private LQG problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the privacy background needed for the rest
of the paper. Section III defines the cloud-enabled differentially private LQG problem. Section IV then gives a
closed-form solution to this problem and provides an algorithm for implementing it, as well as bounds on the
entropy induced by privacy and bounds on error when predicting agents’ states using private information. Next, we
provide numerical simulations in Section V, and then Section VI concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we review the notion of differential privacy and its implementation. Differential privacy is
a rigorous notion of privacy which allows accurate analyses of aggregate data while preserving the privacy of
individuals [9], [23]. Differential privacy is an attractive means of protecting sensitive data because post-processing
on private data does not reduce its privacy guarantees. In particular, filtering private data is permitted without
affecting the privacy of an individual. Moreover, once differential privacy is implemented, an adversary with
complete knowledge of the mechanism used to privatize data has no advantage over an adversary without this
knowledge, meaning that differential privacy is robust to mechanism knowledge [8], [9].
For all of these reasons, we will implement differential privacy in a multi-agent LQ setting. Two types of privacy
are considered below. First the notion of differential privacy is reviewed for static databases. Second, privacy for
trajectories of dynamical systems is discussed, and both forms of privacy will be applied in Section IV. We present
both because this paper uses two instantiations of differential privacy for different data types, and we present this
background to highlight the intricacies of jointly using these two privacy formulations. We first review the basic
definitions required for formally defining differential privacy and then describe the privacy mechanisms we use in
the remainder of the paper. Below, we use the notation [ℓ] = {1, . . . , ℓ} for ℓ ∈ N.
A. Differential Privacy for Static Databases
We begin with differential privacy for static data [9], [12]. Consider a collection of N agents, where agent i
has sensitive data ri ∈ Rni for some ni ∈ N. Differential privacy for databases seeks to protect sensitive data
of individuals while allowing for accurate aggregate queries of groups of users. It does so by making adjacent
databases produce responses to queries which are similar in a precise sense, making the databases approximately
indistinguishable to the recipient of the queries’ outputs. In this work, we provide differential privacy on an individual
basis and the forthcoming background is tailored to this approach. A query is a map q : D → Rni , where D ⊆ Rni
is the collection of all datasets of interest which we treat as vectors in Rni . D can represent the set of possible
salaries, ages, or essentially any other collection of sensitive numerical data. A more extended discussion of all
possible types of databases is given in [9], though treating databases as vectors is one common approach and
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4it is sufficient for our purposes. An adversary or eavesdropper only has access to these privatized outputs and
does not have access to the underlying data which produced them. Therefore, the definition of adjacency is a key
component of any privacy implementation as it specifies which pieces of sensitive data must be made approximately
indistinguishable to any adversary or eavesdropper in order to protect their exact values. The adjacency relation
used for database-style privacy in this setting is defined next.
Definition 1.A. (Adjacency for Databases) Fix an adjacency parameter β > 0. The adjacency relation Adjβ is
defined for all ri, r¯i ∈ Rni as
Adjβ(ri, r¯i) =


1 ‖ri − r¯i‖2 ≤ β
0 otherwise.
△
In words, two databases are adjacent if and only if they differ at most by β. Using this definition of adjacency,
we next define the 2-norm sensitivity of a query which will be used below in defining a privacy mechanism.
Definition 2.A. (Sensitivity for Databases) The 2-norm sensitivity of a query q is defined as the greatest distance
between two query responses which correspond to adjacent databases. Formally,
∆2q = sup
ri,r¯i|Adjβ(ri,r¯i)=1
‖q (ri)− q (r¯i)‖2 . △
The sensitivity of a query is used to determine how much noise must be added to enforce differential privacy.
Noise is added by a mechanism, which is a randomized map used to implement differential privacy. It is the role
of a mechanism to approximate queries’ outputs with private responses. Below, we give a formal definition of
differential privacy for static databases which specifies the probabilistic guarantees that a mechanism must provide.
To do so, we first fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P). This definition considers outputs in the space Rn and uses the
Borel σ-algebra over Rn, denoted Bn [24].
Definition 3.A. (Differential Privacy for Databases) Let ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. A mechanism M :
D × Ω→ Rni is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if and only if, for all adjacent databases ri, r¯i ∈ Rni ,
P [M (ri) ∈ S] ≤ eǫP [M (r¯i) ∈ S] + δ for all S ∈ Bni . △
In words, for two adjacent databases the outputs of the mechanism should be statistically close in the sense
defined above. The constants ǫ and δ tune the level of privacy afforded to the agents, and typical values of ǫ range
from 0.1 to ln 3, while values of δ are usually kept below 0.05. In general, smaller values of each provide stronger
privacy guarantees.
We will now formally state the Gaussian mechanism which ensures (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for the database
setting. The Gaussian mechanism perturbs query outputs with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) zero
mean noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution, and it is defined in terms of the Q-function, which is given by
Q (y) = 1√
2π
∫ ∞
y
e−
z2
2 dz.
The following lemma formally states that the Gaussian mechanism indeed guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differentially privacy.
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5Lemma 1. (Gaussian Mechanism for Databases) Let privacy parameters ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. Let
q : D → Rni be a query and denote its 2-norm sensitivity by ∆2q. The Gaussian mechanism which is defined by
M(ri) = q(ri) + w, where w ∼ N (0, σ2Ini) and σ is bounded according to
σ ≥ ∆2q
2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
with Kδ := Q−1 (δ) ,
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof: See [10, Theorem 3]. 
B. Differential Privacy for Dynamic Systems
Having defined privacy for databases, we now review the notion of differential privacy for dynamic systems to
keep the trajectories of individuals differentially private. Below, we will consider vector-valued trajectories of the
form
Z = (Z (1) , Z (2) , . . . , Z (k) , . . . ) ,
where Z (k) ∈ Rd for all k. We also define the norm
‖Z‖ℓp :=
(
∞∑
k=1
‖Z (k)‖pp
) 1
p
,
where ‖.‖p is the ordinary p-norm on Rd. We further define the set
ℓdp :=
{
Z | Z (k) ∈ Rd, ‖Z‖ℓp <∞
}
.
As above, we consider a collection of N agents, and we denote agent i’s state trajectory by xi. The k
th element
of the trajectory xi is denoted by xi (k) ∈ Rni for some ni ∈ N. The state trajectory xi is contained in the set
ℓ˜ni2 , which is the set of sequences of vectors in R
ni whose finite truncations are all in ℓni2 . Formally, we define the
truncation operator PT over trajectories according to
PT [x] =


x (k) k ≤ T
0 k > T
,
and we say that xi ∈ ℓ˜ni2 if and only if PT [xi] ∈ ℓni2 for all T ∈ N.
As with database privacy, the choice of adjacency relation is a critical part of any differential privacy implemen-
tation for trajectories. We define our adjacency relation now over the space ℓ˜ni2 defined above.
Definition 1.B. (Adjacency For Dynamic Systems) Fix an adjacency parameter B > 0. The adjacency relation AdjB
is defined for all vi, wi ∈ ℓ˜ni2 as
AdjB(vi, wi) =


1 ‖vi − wi‖ℓ2 ≤ B
0 otherwise.
△
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6In words, two trajectories are adjacent if and only if the ℓ2 distance between them is less than or equal to B.
This adjacency relation therefore requires that every agent’s state trajectory be made approximately indistinguishable
from all other state trajectories not more than distance B away when differential privacy is implemented. The choice
of adjacency relation gives rise to the notion of sensitivity of a dynamical system, which we define now.
Definition 2.B. (Sensitivity for Dynamic Systems) The ℓ2-norm sensitivity of a dynamical system G : ℓ˜ni2 → ℓ˜qi2
is defined as the greatest distance between two output trajectories which correspond to adjacent state trajectories.
Formally, for xi, x
′
i ∈ ℓ˜ni2
∆ℓ2G := sup
xi,x
′
i
|Adj(xi,x′i)=1
‖G (xi)− G (x′i)‖ℓ2 . △
Next, we give a formal definition of differential privacy for dynamic systems which specifies the probabilistic
guarantees that a mechanism must provide. To do so, we will use the probability space (Ω,F ,P) that was defined
above. This definition considers outputs in the space ℓ˜qi2 and uses a σ-algebra over ℓ˜
qi
2 , denoted Σ
qi
2 . We omit a
formal construction of this σ-algebra as the technical details are not particularly important in this work, though this
construction can be bound in [24].
Definition 3.B. (Differential Privacy for Dynamic Systems) Let ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. A mechanism
M : ℓ˜ni2 × Ω→ ℓ˜qi2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if and only if, for all adjacent xi, x′i ∈ ℓ˜ni2 , we have
P [M (xi) ∈ S] ≤ eǫP [M (x′i) ∈ S] + δ for all S ∈ Σqi2 . △
In some cases, it is possible to set δ = 0, and (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy is referred to simply as ǫ-differential
privacy. In this paper, we consider only cases in which δ > 0 because enforcing (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy can be
done with the Gaussian mechanism, which adds Gaussian noise for privacy, and using this mechanism allows us
to draw from a substantial existing literature on LQG control. Toward doing so, we present the following lemma
specifying that the Gaussian mechanism for trajectories indeed guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Lemma 2. (Gaussian Mechanism for Dynamic Systems) Let privacy parameters ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given.
Let G denote a system with state trajectories in ℓ˜ni2 and outputs in ℓ˜qi2 , and denote its ℓ2-norm sensitivity by ∆ℓ2G.
Then the Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy takes the form
M (x) = G (x) + w,
where w is a stochastic process with w (k) ∼ N (0, σ2Iqi), Iqi is the qi × qi identity matrix, and
σ ≥ ∆ℓ2G
2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
when Kδ := Q−1 (δ) .
This Gaussian mechanism provides (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof: See [10, Corollary 1]. 
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7In words, the Gaussian mechanism adds i.i.d Gaussian noise point-wise in time to the output of the system to
keep its state trajectory private. For convenience, we define the function
κ (δ, ǫ) =
1
2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
,
and we will use the Gaussian mechanism to enforce differential privacy for the remainder of the paper.
C. Comparison Between Differential Privacy for Dynamic Systems and Static Databases
In this section, we highlight the differences and similarities between privacy for static databases and privacy for
dynamical systems. A precise mathematical definition of differential privacy for static databases is given in [8],
while differential privacy for dynamic systems was introduced in [10]. These are two distinct, standard methods of
implementing differential privacy for two different data types, and the privacy needs and guarantees of each setting
are different.
Both static databases and dynamical systems consist of numerical data. ”Masking” sensitive numerical data with
differential privacy is accomplished by adding noise to the data or some function of it. For a scalar-valued query
of a database, differential privacy is achieved by adding a random element of comparable dimension, i.e., scalar-
valued noise is added to a scalar-valued query. In the same fashion, trajectories are made private by adding noise
in the form of a stochastic process, which is the analogous means of adding ”noise” of the appropriate dimension.
Trajectories are shared so that the recipients receive the outputs pointwise in time. These shared pieces of data are
not repeated queries and should be understood as an agent sharing a single piece of trajectory-valued data which
happens to be received piece-by-piece in time. Sharing these outputs does not constitute many queries, and, instead,
over time these outputs combine to form a single trajectory-valued data release.
The privacy guarantees of these two settings are of course different. These differences are encapsulated in the
adjacency relations appropriate to the spaces in which the sensitive data is contained. Ultimately, we are applying
the standard form of differential privacy for each of the data types considered. In fact, our contribution is not to the
theory of differential privacy itself necessarily. Our contribution mainly rests in taking one of the most widely-used
problems in the control literature and making it differentially private in a general way, which we introduce formally
in the next section.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we introduce the multi-agent LQG tracking control problem to be solved privately. First, we give
the agents’ individual dynamics and equivalent network-level dynamics. Then, we introduce a cloud computer and
formally state the private control problem to be solved. Below, we use the notation P  0 and P ≻ 0 to indicate
that a matrix P is positive semi-definite or positive definite, respectively. Similarly, we write A  B and A ≻ B to
indicate that A−B  0 and A− B ≻ 0, respectively. We use the notation diag(P1, . . . , Pn) to denote the matrix
direct sum of P1 through Pn; if these matrices are square, the notation diag(P1, . . . , Pn) denotes a block diagonal
matrix with blocks P1 through Pn.
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8A. Multi-Agent LQ Formulation
Consider a collection of N agents, indexed over i ∈ [N ]. At time k, agent i has state vector xi (k) ∈ Rni for
some ni ∈ N, which evolves according to
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +Biui(k) + wi(k),
where ui (k) ∈ Rmi , mi ∈ N, is agent i’s input at time k, wi (k) ∈ Rni is process noise, and where Ai ∈ Rni×ni
and Bi ∈ Rni×mi are time-invariant matrices. The probability distribution of the process noise is given as wi (k) ∼
N (0,Wi), where 0 ≺ Wi ∈ Rni×ni , and all such terms have finite variance. Furthermore, wi (k) and wj (k)
are uncorrelated for all agents i and j and all times k. In addition, wi(k) does not depend on prior disturbances
wj (0) , wj (1) , . . . , wj (k − 1) for any j ∈ [N ], but it may be explicitly dependent upon x(k) and u(k).
To analyze the agents’ behavior in aggregate, we define the network-level state and control vectors as
x(k) =


x1(k)
...
xN (k)

 ∈ Rn and u(k) =


u1(k)
...
uN (k)

 ∈ Rm,
where n =
∑
i∈[N ] ni andm =
∑
i∈[N ]mi. By defining w(k) = (w1(k)
T , . . . , wN (k)
T )T ∈ Rn, A = diag(A1, . . . , AN ) ∈
R
n×n, and B = diag(B1, . . . , BN ) ∈ Rn×m, we have the network-level state dynamics
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k). (1)
We consider infinite-horizon problems in which the agents jointly incur the cost
J (x, u) = lim
Kf→∞
1
Kf
E
{
Kf∑
k=1
(x (k)− x¯ (k))T Q (x (k)− x¯ (k)) + u (k)T Ru (k)
}
, (2)
where Q ∈ Rn×n and R ∈ Rm×m are symmetric and positive definite. The vector x¯i(k) ∈ Rni is agent i’s desired
state at time k, and we define the network-level desired state at time k as x¯ (k) =
(
x¯1 (k)
T
, . . . , x¯N (k)
T
)T
. The
full aggregate reference trajectory is denoted {x¯(k)}k∈N, and we assume
lim
k→∞
x¯ (k) = x¯
is finite, i.e., x¯ (k) has a limiting value. The linear dynamics in Equation (1) and quadratic cost in Equation (2)
together define a linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem, a canonical class of optimal control problems
[25]–[27]. The structure of this cost function allows us to penalize deviation from the reference trajectory x¯ so that
agents’ controllers push it towards x¯.
The quadratic cost structure in Equation (2) along with the linear state dynamics in Equation (1) are widely used
in optimal control and have broad applications across network systems. For example, the authors in [28] propose
an LQG control scheme for robotic teleoperation. In another application, the authors in [29] implemented an LQG
controller over a communication network to compensate for delays. In addition, linear dynamics together with LQG
control have been incorporated in many smart grid applications such as [30]–[33] and traffic congestion problems
such as [34], [35]. All of these works consider linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, and these applications
and many others represent potential real-world use cases for private LQG.
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9The problem considered below is distinct from the existing literature because it incorporates the exchange of
differentially privatized data in order to protect agents’ state trajectories, which, to the best of our knowledge, has
not been done before in an LQ tracking control problem. More formally, Problem 1 provides a basic private control
problem statement, given next.
Problem 1. Given an initial random measurement x (0) ∈ Rn of the network state,
minimize
u
J (x, u) = lim
Kf→∞
1
Kf
E
{
Kf∑
k=1
(x (k)− x¯ (k))T Q (x (k)− x¯ (k)) + u (k)T Ru (k)
}
subject to the network dynamics
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k),
while keeping agent i’s state trajectory and desired trajectory differentially private with agent-provided privacy
parameters (ǫi, δi). 
B. Cloud-Based Aggregation
In Problem 1, the cost J is generally non-separable due to its quadratic form. This non-separability means that
J cannot be minimized by each agent using only knowledge of its own state. Instead, each agent’s optimal control
vector will, in general, depend upon all states in the network. To compute the required optimal control vectors,
one may be tempted to have an agent aggregate all agents’ states and then perform the required computations,
though this inequitably distributes the computational load across agents, and, in some settings, the aggregate cost
J may only be known by a central network operator. We therefore introduce a cloud computer to aggregate and
process information and distribute it to the agents. The technology of cloud computing provides the ability to
communicate with many agents, rapidly perform demanding computations, and broadcast the results. Moreover,
these capabilities can be seamlessly and remotely added into networks of agents, making the cloud a natural choice
of central aggregator for this work [15].
At time k, the cloud requests from agent i the value yi (k) = Cixi (k), where Ci ∈ Rqi×ni is a constant matrix.
We refer to yi as either agent i’s output or as agent i’s state measurement. To protect its state trajectory, agent i
sends a differentially private form of yi (k) to the cloud. Using these values from each agent, the cloud computes
the optimal controller for each agent at time k. The cloud sends these control values to the agents, the agents use
them in their local state updates, and then this process of exchanging information repeats. Next we specify the
exact manner in which each agent makes its transmissions to the cloud differentially private.
C. Differentially Private Communications
At time k, agent i’s transmission of yi (k) to the cloud can potentially reveal its state trajectory, thereby
compromising agent i’s privacy. Accordingly, agent i adds noise to the state measurement yi (k) before sending
it to the cloud in order to keep its state trajectory differentially private according to the rules of trajectory-level
differential privacy in Section II-B. In this work, the system G introduced in Definition 2.B, is a memory-less
dynamical system which is a map G : ℓ˜ni2 → ℓ˜qi2 that maps xi(k) to yi(k) at each point in time, and this is what
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we will privatize. Agent i first selects its own privacy parameters ǫi > 0 and δi ∈ (0, 1/2). Supposing that agent i
uses the adjacency relation Adjbi for some bi > 0 (cf. Definition 1.B), we have the following elementary lemma
concerning the ℓ2-norm sensitivity of yi, which we denote ∆ℓ2yi.
Lemma 3. The ℓ2-norm sensitivity of yi satisfies ∆ℓ2yi ≤ s1 (Ci) bi, where s1 (·) denotes the maximum singular
value of a matrix.
Proof: Consider two trajectories xi, x
′
i ∈ ℓ˜ni2 such that Adjbi (xi, x′i) = 1, and set yi (k) = Cixi (k) and y′i (k) =
Cix
′
i (k). Then we find
‖yi − y′i‖ℓ2 ≤ ‖Ci‖2 ‖xi − x′i‖ℓ2 ≤ s1 (Ci) bi. 
With the bound in Lemma 3, agent i sends the cloud
y˜i (k) := yi (k) + vi (k) = Cixi (k) + vi (k) , (3)
where the privacy noise vi (k) ∼ N
(
0, σ2i Ini
)
is a Gaussian random variable, and where σi ≥ κ (δi, ǫi) s1 (Ci) bi
in accordance with Lemma 2. Defining the matrix V = diag
(
σ21In1 , . . . , σ
2
NInN
)
, the aggregate privacy vector in
the system at time k is v (k) =
(
v1 (k)
T
, . . . , vN (k)
T
)T
, and we have v (k) ∼ N (0, V ) for all k ∈ N.
In the output Equation (3), measurement noise can be included and all of the forthcoming analyses in this paper
readily accommodate this change. However, as this paper is focused on bounding the effects of privacy, we exclude
the measurement noise from the subsequent developments in order to isolate the effects of privacy in particular.
In addition to state measurements, the agents’ reference trajectories are a significant source of “side information,”
which, if disclosed, can reveal the agents’ intentions and weaken the privacy of their trajectories. Only the limiting
value of agent i’s reference trajectory, denoted x¯i, will be needed by the cloud and agent i will add noise to it before
sending it to the cloud. The value of x¯i is static in time and we therefore use the database notion of differential
privacy for keeping it private and this follows the rules for database style privacy in Section II-A. To protect x¯i,
agent i selects privacy parameters ǫ¯i and δ¯i. Then privacy noise is added according to
x˜i := x¯i + w¯i,
where agent i chooses the privacy noise for its reference via w¯i ∼ N
(
0, σ¯2i Ini
)
according to Lemma 1, with
σ¯i ≥ κ
(
δ¯i, ǫ¯i
)
βi and agent i using the adjacency relation Adjβi as in Definition 1.A.
In this privacy implementation, we assume that all matrices Ai, Bi, Ci, Vi, and Wi are public information. In
addition, we impose the following assumption on the dynamics and cost that are considered.
Assumption 1. In the cost J , Q = QT ≻ 0 and R = RT ≻ 0. In addition, the pair (A,B) is controllable, and there
exists a matrix F such that Q = FTF and such that the pair (A,F ) is observable. △
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of a solution to a certain algebraic Riccati equation that we will encounter
below [26, Chapter 4]. In addition, we assume that xˆi (0), the expected value of the agent i’s initial state, is publicly
known, along with agent i’s privacy parameters ǫi, δi, ǫ¯i and δ¯i. We also assume that the matrices Q and R are
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known only to the cloud and that the cloud does not share these matrices with any agents or eavesdroppers. With
this privacy implementation in hand, we next give a private reformulation of Problem 1.
D. Reformulation of Problem 1 with Privacy
Reformulating Problem 1 to account for privacy must explicitly account for the cloud’s knowledge. Agents’
requirement that {x¯i}i∈[N ] be kept private means that the cloud cannot use {x¯i}i∈[N ] and must instead use {x˜i}i∈[N ]
in its computations. In addition, because we consider average cost per stage problems (as is common in infinite-
horizon LQG), the time-varying nature of agents’ reference trajectories does not affect the final form of the agents’
optimal controllers, and we may substitute the time-varying references for their limit points. Here because the agents
privatize {x¯i}i∈[N ], only the privatized limit points {x˜i}i∈[N ] can be used for such a purpose, and Problem 2 must
take this into account in the cost J . Of course, this changes the cost that agents minimize and, in general, will
increase it in Problem 2 relative to Problem 1. We first state and solve Problem 2 and then quantify this increase in
terms of known parameters in Theorem 2 below as a means of quantifying the impact of privacy. Problem 2 itself
is formally stated next.
Problem 2. Minimize
J˜ (x, u) = lim
Kf→∞
1
Kf
E
{
Kf∑
k=1
(x (k)− x˜)T Q (x (k)− x˜) + u (k)T Ru (k)
}
over all control signals u with u (k) ∈ Rm, and subject to the dynamics and output equations
x (k + 1) = Ax (k) +Bu (k) + w (k)
y˜ (k) = Cx (k) + v (k) ,
where C = diag (C1, . . . , CN ) and where xˆ (0) := E [x (0)] is public and agent i has specified its privacy parameters
(ǫi, δi) and (ǫ¯i, δ¯i). 
IV. PRIVATE LQG TRACKING CONTROL
In this section we solve Problem 2. Problem 2 takes the form of a linear quadratic Gaussian tracking control
problem, which is a well-studied problem in the optimal control literature [17], [36]. We first solve Problem 2 and
then quantify the effects of privacy upon this solution. Below, we use the notation λi (·) to denote the ith largest
eigenvalue of a matrix and the notation si (·) to denote the ith largest singular value of a matrix.
A. Solving Problem 2
Due to the stochastic terms in the system, the controllers we develop cannot rely on the exact value of x (k).
Instead, the controllers must rely on its expected value conditioned on all past inputs and outputs, denoted xˆ (k) =
E [x (k) | I (k)] , in which I(k) denotes all information available to the controller at time k and is defined as
I(k) = {u (0) , . . . , u (k − 1) , y (0) , . . . , y (k)} .
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Problem 2 is an infinite-horizon discrete-time LQG tracking control problem, and it is known [37] that the optimal
controller for such problems takes the form
u∗ (k) = Lxˆ (k) +Mg, (4)
where
L := − (R+BTKB)−1BTKA, (5)
and
M := − (R+BTKB)−1BT . (6)
Here, K is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati equation
K = ATKA−ATKB (R+BTKB)−1BTKA+Q (7)
and
g = AT
[
I −KB (R +BTKB)−1BT ] g −Qx˜. (8)
Ordinarily, g would depend on x¯, though the cloud only has x˜ and this is what it must use. Computing the state
estimate E [x (k) | I(k)] can be done for infinite time horizons using a time-invariant Kalman filter [26, Section
5.2]. This filter has a recursive update law of the form
xˆ (k + 1) = Axˆ (k) +Bu (k) + ΣCTV −1
(
y (k + 1)− CAxˆ (k)− CBu (k)
)
, (9)
where the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ is given by
Σ = Σ− ΣCT (CΣCT + V )−1 CΣ. (10)
The a priori error covariance matrix Σ is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati
equation
Σ = AΣAT −AΣCT (CΣCT + V )−1 CΣAT +W. (11)
Upon substituting Equation (4) into Equation (9), the update law for the Kalman filter takes the form
xˆ (k + 1) = (A+BL) xˆ (k) +BMg +ΣCTV −1 (y (k + 1)− C (A+BL) xˆ (k)− CBMg) .
As discussed in Section III-B, the cloud is responsible for generating control values for each agent at each point
in time using Equation (4), and it therefore runs the Kalman filter in Equation (9). Here, we develop an algorithm
for the implementation of the controller for each agent at each point in time. The flow of information in the
network first has agent i send y˜i (k) to the cloud at time k, then has the cloud form a network level output vector
y˜ (k) =
(
y˜1 (k)
T
, . . . , y˜N (k)
T
)T
and use it to estimate xˆ (k + 1). Next, the cloud computes u∗ (k) = Lxˆ (k)+Mg,
and finally the cloud sends u∗i (k), i ∈ [N ], to agent i. The control signals u∗i (k) preserve the differential privacy
of all private data, and therefore sharing agent i’s input signal with other agents does not incur any privacy loss.
With respect to implementation, the terms K,L,M,Σ, and g can be all computed a priori by the cloud a single
time and then used repeatedly in generating control values to send to the agents, substantially reducing the cloud’s
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computational burden at runtime, and allowing it to quickly generate state estimates and control values. With this
in mind, we state the full solution to Problem 2 in Algorithm 1, and we formally state the privacy guarantees of
Algorithm 1 in the following theorem.
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private LQG (Solution to Problem 2)
Data: Public information Ai, Bi, Ci, ǫi, δi, ǫ¯i, δ¯i, xˆi(0), Wi, Vi
1 Initialize the cloud with all public information
2 For all i, initialize agent i with Ai, Bi, Ci. Agent i chooses (ǫi, δi) and knows its exact initial state xi(0) but
does not share it. In addition, agent i chooses (ǫ¯i, δ¯i) and computes x˜i and sends it to the cloud
3 In the cloud, find K using Equation (7), then precompute L and M using Equation (5) and (6) respectively, Σ
according to Equation (10), and g using Equation (8)
4 for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
5 for i = 1, . . . , N do
6 Agent i generates vi(k) ∼ N (0, σ2i Ini)
7 Agent i sends the cloud the private output y˜i(k) := Cixi(k) + vi(k)
8 In the cloud, compute xˆ(k) with Equation (9)
9 In the cloud, compute u∗(k) = Lxˆ(k) +Mg and send u∗i (k) to agent i
10 for i = 1, . . . , N do
11 Agent i updates its state via xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +Biu
∗
i (k) + wi(k)
Theorem 1. For all i ∈ [N ], Algorithm 1 provides (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy for agent i’s state trajectory and
(ǫ¯i, δ¯i)-differential privacy for x¯i in the multi-agent LQG setting in Problem 2.
Proof: Applying Lemma 1, noise added according to privacy parameters (ǫ¯i, δ¯i) provides (ǫ¯i, δ¯i)-differential
privacy for the limiting value of each agent’s reference signal, x¯i. Using Lemma 2, adding Gaussian noise vi(k)
to the state measurements yi(k) according to the privacy parameters (ǫi, δi) at each time k guarantees (ǫi, δi)-
differential privacy for the trajectories of each agent participating in the network.
The information exchanged by the agents and the cloud in Algorithm 1 is summarized in Figure 1.
The following theorem quantifies the the impact of x˜ on the total cost J incurred by the network. We denote the
total cost of the network when using x˜ in place of x¯ by J˜(x, u) and we use J(x, u) to denote what the cost would
be if x¯ itself were used.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the matrix [I − (A + BL)T ] is invertible. The cost incurred by the network of agents
using x˜ in place of x¯ is
J˜(x, u) = J(x, u) + E
{
w¯TQw¯
}
+ E
{
(Hw¯)TR(Hw¯)
}
= J(x, u) + tr(QW ) + tr(HTRHW ),
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y˜1 (k) y˜N (k)u
∗
N
(k)u∗
1
(k)
N1
Compute xˆi(k), u
∗
i
(k)
N1
x˜Nx˜1
Compute
K, L, M , Σ, g
k > 0k = 0
Fig. 1. Summary of information transmission between the agents and the cloud at initial time k = 0, which includes necessary precomputations,
and each time k > 0.
where w¯ = (w¯T1 , . . . , w¯
T
N )
T , W = diag(σ¯21In1 , . . . , σ¯
2
NInN ), and H := M
[
I − (A+BL)T ]−1.
Proof: See authors’ technical report in [37]. The last equality is from [38, Equation (318)].
B. Quantifying the Effects of Privacy
Algorithm 1 solves Problem 2, though it is intuitively clear that adding noise for the sake of privacy will diminish
the ability of the cloud to compute optimal control values. Indeed, the purpose of differential privacy in this problem
is to protect an agent’s state from the cloud, other agents, and any eavesdroppers. Since the agents’ state values are
protected, the cloud is forced to estimate agents’ states in order to generate control values for them. Accordingly,
one may wish to quantify the ability of the cloud to accurately estimate the agents’ state values, which is the focus
of this subsection.
The cloud both implements a Kalman filter and computes the controller u∗ (k), though noise added for privacy
only affects the Kalman filter. To see this, note that the network-level controller defined in Equation (4) takes the
form u∗ (k) = Lxˆ (k) +Mg, while the optimal controller with no privacy noise (i.e., v (k) ≡ 0 for all k) would
take the same form with the expectation carried out only over the process noise. Similarly, in the deterministic case
of v (k) ≡ 0 and w (k) ≡ 0 for all k, the optimal controller is u∗ (k) = Lx (k)+Mg. The only difference between
these controllers comes from changes in the estimate of x (k) or in using x (k) exactly. This is an example of the
so-called “certainty equivalence principle” [26], and it demonstrates that the controller in Algorithm 1 is entirely
unaware of the presence or absence of noise. Instead, the effects of noise in the system are compensated for only by
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the Kalman filter defined in Equation (9), and we therefore examine the impact of privacy noise upon the Kalman
filter in Algorithm 1. Related work in [10] specifies procedures for designing differentially private Kalman filters,
though here we use a Kalman filter to process private data and quantify the effects of privacy upon it. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first study to do so.
One natural way to study this trade-off is through bounding the information content in the Kalman filter as a
function of the privacy noise, as differential privacy explicitly seeks to mask sensitive information by corrupting it
with noise. In our case, we consider the differential entropy in the error in xˆ (k) as a proxy for the information content
of the signals sent to the cloud [39]. Shannon entropy has been used to quantify the effects of differential privacy
in other settings, including in distributed linear control systems where database-type differential privacy is applied
[36]. Though differential entropy does not have the same axiomatic foundation as Shannon entropy, it is useful for
the Gaussian distribution because it bounds the extent of the sublevel sets of R−1, where R (y) = 1− 2Q (y), i.e.,
the volume of covariance ellipsoids. We can therefore quantify the effects of differentially private masking upon the
cloud by studying how privacy noise changes ln det (Σ), which is within a constant factor of the differential entropy
of error in xˆ. The analysis we present differs from previous work because we apply trajectory-level differential
privacy and quantify the resulting differential entropy in a Kalman filter that processes these trajectories. Toward
presenting this result, we have the following lemma concerning the determinants of matrices related by a matrix
inequality.
Lemma 4. Let P  0 and Q  0 satisfy P  Q. Then det (P ) ≥ det (Q) and ln det (P ) ≥ ln det (Q).
Proof: This follows from the monotonicity of ln and the fact that λi (X) ≥ λi (Y ) [40, Theorem 16.F.1] when
X  Y .
Another preliminary lemma needed is Hadamard’s inequality, which we state now.
Lemma 5. Let P  0. Then detP ≤∏ni=1 Pii.
Proof: See [40, Theorem 9.B.5].
The next lemma concerns relating the product of a collection to the maximum element of that collection.
Lemma 6. Let {a1, . . . , an} be a finite collection of real scalars. Then
n∏
i=1
ai ≤ max
1≤i≤n
ai + lnn.
Proof: See Page 71 of [41].
Below we will also relate the diagonal elements of symmetric matrices to the largest eigenvalues of such matrices,
using the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let M =MT ≻ 0. Then
max
1≤i≤n
Mii ≤ λ1 (M) .
Proof: This follows from the Courant minimax principle; see, e.g., [42], Page 179.
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Next, we have the following lemma which gives a matrix upper bound on solutions to a discrete algebraic Riccati
equation.
Lemma 8. Suppose Σ is the unique positive semi-definite solution to the discrete time algebraic Riccati Equa-
tion (11), where C is diagonal, and define
γi =
σ2iWii
σ2i + C
2
iiWii
,
along with Γ = diag (γ1, . . . , γn). Then
λ1 (Σ) ≥ s2n (A)λ1 (Γ) + λn (W ) =: η.
Furthermore, if
s21 (A) < 1 +
(
s2n (A) λ1 (Γ) + λn (W )
) · min
i∈[n]
C2ii
σ2i
,
then
Σ ≤ λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
AAT +W.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 2 in [43].
We now present our main results on bounding the log-determinant of the steady state Kalman filter error covariance
in the private LQG problem. In particular, we study the log-determinant of the a priori error covariance, Σ, because
Σ measures the error in the cloud’s predictions about the state of the system. Bounding the log-determinant of
Σ therefore bounds the entropy seen at the cloud when making predictions about the state of the network in the
presence of noise added for privacy.
Theorem 3. Let Σ denote the steady-state a priori error covariance in the cloud’s Kalman filter in Algorithm 1. If
all hypotheses of Lemma 8 hold and Assumption 1 holds, then
ln detΣ ≤ ln
[
λ1 (W ) s
2
1 (A)
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
+ λ1 (W ) + lnn
]
,
with η defined as in Lemma 8, and where the term
ηλn
(
CTV −1C
)
= s21 (A) ·max
i∈[n]
σ2iWii
σ2i + C
2
iiWii
· min
i∈[n]
C2ii
σ2i
is the only one affected by privacy. The privacy dependent parameter σi is characterized by σi ≥ ∆ℓ2G2ǫi
(
Kδi +
√
K2δi + 2ǫi
)
.
Proof: With the hypothesis that C is diagonal, we see that
CTV −1C = diag
(
C211
σ21
, . . . ,
Cnn
σ2n
)
,
which gives
λn
(
CTV −1C
)
= min
i≤i≤n
C2ii
σ2i
.
Lemma 8 then gives
Σ  λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
AAT +W,
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where applying Lemma 4 gives
detΣ ≤ det
[
λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
AAT +W
]
.
The argument of the determinant on the right-hand side is a positive-definite matrix, and applying Lemma 5
therefore gives
detΣ ≤
n∏
i=1
[
λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
[
AAT
]
ii
+Wii
]
.
Applying Lemma 6 then provides the bound
detΣ ≤
(
λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
)
max
1≤i≤n
[
AAT
]
ii
+ max
i≤i≤n
Wii + lnn.
Using Lemma 7 next provides
detΣ ≤
(
λ1 (W )
1 + ηλn (CTV −1C)− s21 (A)
)
s21 (A) + λ1 (W ) + lnn.
Taking the logarithm of both sides then gives the desired result.
To complement this entropy upper bound, we will next present an entropy lower bound. Toward doing so, we
state the following lemmas.
Lemma 9. If P ∈ Rn×n and Q ∈ Rn×n are positive definite Hermitian matrices, then det(P +Q) ≥ detP +detQ.
Proof: This is implied by Minkowski’s determinant theorem [44, Corollary 8.4.15].
Lemma 10. Let P ∈ Rn×n and Q ∈ Rn×n be positive definite Hermitian matrices with p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn and
q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qn denoting their eigenvalues, respectively. Then
det(P +Q) ≤
n∏
i=1
(pi + qn+1−i).
Proof: See the proof of Theorem 1 in [45].
Next, we introduce the following lemma rearranging the terms in the algebraic Riccati equation.
Lemma 11. The algebraic Riccati equation given in Equation (11) can be rewritten as
Σ = A
(
Σ−1 + CTV −1C
)−1
AT +W. (12)
Proof: This can be shown using the well-known Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury matrix identity. See [46, Section
1] for further details.
Lemma 11 further facilitates the development of entropy lower bounds and allows us to repurpose results from
the existing literature. Toward doing so, we now introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let Σ ≻ 0 be the solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati Equation (11). Then
Σ ≥ A (W−1 + CTV −1C)−1AT +W.
Proof: See [46, Theorem 3.1].
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We now present a lower bound on the entropy in the cloud’s Kalman filter in the form of a lower bound on
ln det(Σ).
Theorem 4. Let Σ ≻ 0 be the solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati Equation (11), and let λ1(W ) ≥ · · · ≥ λn(W )
denote the eigenvalues of W . Then under the same hypotheses as Theorem 3,
ln det (Σ) ≥ ln
[
det (A)
2
λ−1n (W ) + λ1 (CTV −1C) + lnn
+ det(W )
]
.
The only term affected by privacy parameters is λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
where the term V is dependent upon ǫi and
δi for each agent in the network. If, in addition, C is diagonal, then λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
= maxi≤i≤n
C2ii
σ2
i
, where the
privacy dependent parameter σi is given by σi ≥ ∆ℓ2G2ǫi
(
Kδi +
√
K2δi + 2ǫi
)
.
Proof: Using Lemma 4 in Lemma 12, we find
det (Σ) ≥ det
(
A
(
W−1 + CTV −1C
)−1
AT +W
)
.
Using Lemma 9 we find
det (Σ) ≥ det
(
A
(
W−1 + CTV −1C
)−1
AT
)
+ det (W ) .
Using the fact that det (MN) = det (M) det (N) , we write
det (Σ) ≥ (det (A))2 det
((
W−1 + CTV −1C
)−1)
+ det (W )
=
(det (A))
2
det (W−1 + CTV −1C)
+ det(W ). (13)
In order to find the lower bound for the right-hand side of Equation (13), the term in the denominator needs to
be upper bounded. The matrices CTV −1C and W are positive definite, and using Lemma 10, an upper bound for
the denominator in Equation (13) is given by
det
(
W−1 + CTV −1C
) ≤ n∏
i=1
(
λ−1n+1−i(W ) + λi
(
CTV −1C
))
.
Then
det(W−1 + CTV −1C) ≤
n∏
i=1
(
λ−1n+1−i(W ) + λi
(
CTV −1C
))
≤ max
1≤i≤n
[
λ−1n+1−i(W ) + λi
(
CTV −1C
) ]
+ lnn,
which follows from Lemma 6. Since λi
(
CTV −1C
)
and λi(W ) are positive we can write maxλ
−1
i (W ) = λ
−1
n (W ),
and we have
det
(
W−1 + CTV −1C
) ≤ λ−1n (W ) + λ1 (CTV −1C)+ lnn.
The theorem follows by substituting this bound in Equation (13).
Together, Theorems 3 and 4 give entropy bounds that can be used to balance the privacy needs of users with
the cloud’s needs for accurate information. Specifically, while a user may be tempted to provide very small privacy
parameters, these results quantify the extent to which this is harmful in generating control values. These results
can be used, for example, to place bounds on admissible privacy parameters or, in other cases to estimate the
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degradation in performance that results from very small privacy parameters based on the increases in entropy that
result.
Remark 1. The a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter Σ in Algorithm 1 is block diagonal. The entropy
bounds in Theorems 3 and 4 which are developed for the network of agents are applicable to each agent individually
by applying them to single diagonal blocks of Σ, though the focus of this paper is on the network as a whole.
C. Quantifying an Adversary’s Capabilities
Thus far, we have developed and analyzed an implementation of differential privacy in feedback control in
the form of an LQG tracking control problem. The sensitive data of each agent is protected by ensuring private
communications through adding noise, though beyond the preceding analysis, one may wonder how accurately
an adversary can predict the next state of an agent by eavesdropping on the privatized data transmissions in the
network.
To answer this question we develop bounds on the mean square error (MSE) of such a prediction, given by
E
[‖x(k)− xpred(k)‖2],
where xpred(k) denotes an adversary’s prediction of the agents’ states given access to all data transmitted in the
network. We present the following theorem to provide analytical MSE bounds quantifying an adversary’s capabilities
to infer the states of the agents from the differential privacy implementation in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5. Suppose that an adversary intercepts all communications between the agents and the cloud in Algo-
rithm 1 and has all public information. Then, for any post-processing method that they apply in predicting the
next state of all agents collectively, the MSE of their prediction will always be bounded below (under the same
conditions as Theorems 3 and 4) according to
MSE ≥ tr(W ) + tr(A
TA)λn(W )
1 + λn(W ) · max
i∈[N ]
C2
ii
σ2
i
,
where σi ≥ ∆ℓ2G2ǫi
(
Kδi +
√
K2δi + 2ǫi
)
.
Proof: The Kalman filter is the optimal estimator in this setting (linear systems with Gaussian noise) in the
sense that it gives the minimum mean square error in the predictions it makes [47]. The MSE of the prediction
is equal to the trace of the a priori error covariance matrix, which itself is the solution to the algebraic Riccati
Equation (11). Thus, for a Kalman filter, MSE = tr(Σ). With this in mind, we can lower-bound the prediction
error for any estimator by lower bounding tr(Σ). To do so, we obtain the following equation by taking the trace of
Equation (12):
tr(Σ)− tr(W ) = tr
[
A(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1AT
]
= tr
[
ATA(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1
]
.
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Next we use the fact that for Γ1 ≻ 0 and Γ2 ≻ 0, tr(Γ1Γ2) ≥ tr(Γ1)λmin(Γ2), [48, Lemma 1]. Then,
tr(Σ)− tr(W ) ≥ tr(ATA)λn
[
(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1
]
=
tr(ATA)
λ1 (Σ−1 + CTV −1C)
≥ tr(A
TA)
λ1(Σ−1) + λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
=
tr(ATA)λn(Σ)
1 + λn(Σ)λ1
(
CTV −1C
) ,
where we have used that λ1(Σ
−1) = λn(Σ). Based on [49, Theorem 3.1], Σ ≥W , and therefore λi(Σ) ≥ λi(W )
for all i. Using this fact, we find
tr(Σ)− tr(W ) ≥ tr(A
TA)λn(W )
1 + λn(W )λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
=
tr(ATA)λn(W )
1 + λn(W ) · max
i∈[N ]
C2
ii
σ2
i
,
which completes the proof.
These bounds apply not only to Algorithm 1, but to trajectory-level privacy implementations for any linear
dynamical system and may therefore be of independent interest.
Theorem 5 provides a lower bound on the MSE for an adversary’s prediction for an entire collection of agents.
This result can be extended to investigate the ability of an adversary to predict the next state of a single agent,
which gives a more granular perspective on an adversary’s ability to predict the state of individuals and we present
this extension below.
Corollary 1. Assume an adversary intercepts all communications and has all public information in Algorithm 1.
Then their prediction of the next state for any single agent is (under the same conditions as Theorems 3 and 4)
bounded by
MSE ≥ tr(Wi) + tr(A
T
i Ai)λn(Wi)
1 + λn(Wi)
σ2i
· max
j∈[ni]
C2i,j
,
where Ci,j is the j-th diagonal entry of the matrix Ci.
Proof: This proof is substantially similar to the proof of Theorem 5 and is therefore omitted.
Having characterized an adversary’s capabilities in this setting we will next provide numerical simulations for
both Algorithm 1 and the MSE bounds derived in this section.
V. CASE STUDY
A. Simulation Results of Algorithm 1
In this section, we present simulation results for a real-world application of our private LQG implementation
in Algorithm 1. The multi-agent setting in this study is obtained from the existing privacy literature [10], which
is inspired by the privacy concerns in traffic monitoring systems in [50] and [51]. We consider a network of
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N = 100 agents where each agent represents a vehicle in a traffic monitoring system. Vehicle i’s state is denoted
by xi(k) =
[
ξi(k) ξ˙i(k)
]T
where ξi(k) and ξ˙i(k) are its position and velocity, respectively, vehicle i’s state
xi (k) belongs to R
2 for all k, and each state trajectory is in the set ℓ˜22. Each agent is defined to have identical
dynamics and process noise covariance. A simplified dynamics of each agent in this network is
xi(k) =

 1 Ts
0 1

xi(k) +

 T 2s/2
Ts

ui(k) + wi(k),
where Ts is a sampling period. We also select Ci = I2×2. The process noise covariance is set to be Wi = I2×2.
The reference trajectory for agent i is x¯i(k) =
[
tanh(k) tanh(k)
]T
with the limiting value x¯i = [ 1 1 ]
T
for all i.
We consider the case in which all agents select identical privacy parameters, namely, (ǫi, δi) = (ln 3, 0.001) for all
i, giving σi = 2.96. Let Ts = 1 and R = 10
−1I100×100. In addition, x¯i is made private with w¯i, where the privacy
parameters are (ǫ¯i, δ¯i) = (ln 3, 0.2), giving σ¯i = 1.15 for all i. For these simulations, the elements on the diagonal
of the matrix Q are set to Qjj = 500 and the off-diagonal elements of Q were randomly chosen to be non-zero,
meaning that the cost J is not separable over agents. The off-diagonal entries of Q represent coupling between
vehicles and can be understood as repelling forces between trajectories of vehicles. Algorithm 1 was simulated for
100 timesteps, and the results of this simulation are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The effects of privacy upon the cost are illustrated in Figure 2. As expected, the quadratic cost in a private
network implementation is higher than an equivalent network of agents in which privacy is not enforced. However,
this increase becomes relatively modest over time, which indicates that privacy does not substantially increase costs
over long time horizons. In Figure 3, the estimated state trajectory of an agent, which is the optimal estimate
(in the least squares sense), shows temporal variations from the true trajectory. However, even with the degraded
information reported to the cloud, the states of the agents are still regulated close to their desired values, indicating
that this degradation does not preclude acceptable system performance.
In Figure 4, the dependence of entropy on the privacy parameters ǫ and δ is further illustrated. In particular,
Figure 4 shows the effect on ln det Σ as we vary the privacy parameters ǫ and δ. The value of ln detΣ is
monotonically decreasing as ǫ and δ increase, which is intuitive because weaker privacy guarantees should reduce
entropy. This demonstrates that changing the overall privacy level in the system indeed results in predictable changes
in the behavior of the entropy of the system, as were shown by the bounds developed in Theorems 3 and 4.
B. Simulation Results of Theorem 5
In this section we give a numerical example for the results given in Corollary 1, which also demonstrates the
results of Theorem 5. We assume that an adversary is intercepting all communications in the network implemented
in Section V-A using that same problem formulation. The results of this simulation are illustrated in Tables I and II
and Figure 5.
The bound in Corollary 1 compares favorably with the exact value of the MSE in the adversary’s predictions,
indicating that our bound provides an accurate estimate of an adversary’s minimum MSE. It can therefore be used
to inform agents’ privacy parameters based on their desire to avoid leaking information to an adversary. Moreover,
January 8, 2019 DRAFT
22
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 10
5
Fig. 2. The time-average cost incurred in the network of 100 agents when privacy is enforced (solid line) compared to the average cost of an
identical network where privacy is not implemented (dashed line). As expected, adding privacy noise causes the cost in the network to increase.
However, over time these increases become small relative to the noise-free cost, indicating that privacy is not excessively burdensome with
respect to cost.
TABLE I
Comparison between an adversary’s minimum prediction MSE and the corresponding bound from Corollary 1, with ǫ fixed at ln(3) and δ
changing
ǫ ln(3) ln(3) ln(3) ln(3) ln(3) ln(3)
δ 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
tr(Σ) 9.29 5.74 4.57 3.89 3.41 3.06
Cor. 1 4.52 4.05 3.71 3.42 3.17 2.93
in light of the agents’ states being near to 1, an MSE of approximately 10 suggests that an adversary can learn
little about agents that are using differential privacy in this problem.
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Fig. 3. Actual states, xi, reported measured state values, y˜i, and estimated value of the states, xˆi, for agent 1. Here xˆij denotes the jth element
of agent i’s state. Although some very large noise terms are present, the control values provided by the cloud are able to regulate agent 1’s
state to remain near its desired trajectory, and this behavior was typical for all agents in our simulation runs.
TABLE II
Comparison between an adversary’s minimum prediction MSE and the corresponding bound from Corollary 1, with δ fixed at 0.05 and ǫ
changing
δ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
ǫ 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
tr(Σ) 118.85 47.37 20.09 12.66 9.34 7.49
Cor. 1 4.98 4.95 4.85 4.70 4.53 4.35
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of distributed linear quadratic optimal control with agent-specified
differential privacy requirements. We have related this problem to the well-studied LQG problem and have shown
how to bound the uncertainty in the network-level joint state estimate in terms of the privacy parameters specified by
the individual agents. This work enables agents to collectively solve an optimal control problem without revealing
sensitive data. Future applications include autonomous driving, in which sensitive user location data may be shared,
and smart power girds, in which users’ power consumption data is shared.
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Fig. 4. Effects of differential privacy parameters ǫ and δ on entropy. As we increase the privacy parameters the network is less private and
entropy decreases, as expected. Moreover, it can be seen that the largest changes in entropy occur when ǫ and δ are small, which demonstrates
that even small changes to very private parameters can substantially improve system function.
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